Empirical Tax Research
Tax Regulations
Corporate Investment Decisions
Payout Policies
Corporate Governance
Corporate Finance
with Martin Jacob in Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2025, 80 (1): 101756
with Antonio De Vito, Martin Jacob, and Robert Vossebürger in Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2025, 79 (2-3): 101758
Solo-authored in Journal of Corporate Finance, 2023, 79, 102380
with Martin Jacob, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Robert Raney
Latest Draft: May 2025
This paper examines the pricing of ESG (i.e., environmental, social, and governance) in product markets. Price effects may be demand-driven, reflecting consumers' willingness to pay for ESG outcomes, or supply-driven, as firms pass ESG-related costs onto consumers. For identification, we focus on ESG-related incidents in the airline industry, which offers comprehensive public data on consumer prices. We observe that airlines increase ticket prices following ESG incidents. The price reaction is more pronounced when customers are less elastic, airlines are more elastic, or the demand-side effect is weaker. Collectively, our results show that consumers (at least partly) pay for the ESG initiatives and that ESG-related price increases cannot be fully explained by consumer demand for better environmental or social outcomes.
with Eliezer Fich, Johanna Kling, and Barbara Stage
Latest Draft: May 2026
Media Coverage: The CLS Blue Sky Blog, ECGI Blog
Using data from 43 countries, we find that reductions in the debt tax benefit resulting from interest limitation rules decrease M&A activity. The decline is concentrated in cash-financed deals and among debt-dependent acquirers, while stock-financed deals are unaffected. Transactions occurring after these rules take effect exhibit weaker market reactions, lower realized returns, and a shift toward smaller, less profitable, less efficient, and less innovative targets. We find little evidence that tax-motivated deals drive this decline. Our findings suggest that interest limitation rules hinder value-enhancing, debt-dependent acquisitions and thus distort resource allocation through the market for corporate control.
Paying Taxes Conscientiously: CEO Conscientiousness and the Balancing of Stakeholder Interests
with Sebastian Firk, and Jan Christoph Hennig
Latest Draft: March 2026
The demand for actively considering the interests of multiple stakeholder groups in corporate decision-making has notably intensified. This shift toward a multistakeholder perspective assigns CEOs a crucial role, challenging them to balance partially competing interests effectively. Despite growing interest among accounting scholars in “CEO effects,” our understanding remains limited regarding which specific traits may predict a particularly diligent balancing of multistakeholder interests. In this study, we propose that CEOs with higher conscientiousness—one of the five fundamental personality traits—exhibit an idiosyncratic tendency to carefully balance the interests of various stakeholder groups because they have both the capacity to process complex and competing claims and a strong sense of responsibility and fairness. Our empirical examination focuses on tax avoidance, an area where corporate stakeholder interests often diverge from broader societal interests. Using data from CEO appointments at S&P 1500 firms, we find that CEO conscientiousness is associated with less tax avoidance. Our results further indicate that situational cues that trigger a more urgent societal interest in tax payments amplify the negative association between CEO conscientiousness and tax avoidance. Conversely, cues emphasizing the urgency of corporate stakeholder interests in minimizing taxes weaken this association. Overall, our findings suggest that variations in a fundamental CEO personality trait can help in understanding the extent to which CEOs balance competing stakeholder interests into their decision-making processes.
with Andreas Oestreicher